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RESSURECTING AND MODERNIZING THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND 1953 - 1963: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

This review article was based on a study conducted to determine major reasons for the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and its demise in 1963. It suggests resurrection and modernization of the federation based on African principles which would include the addition of Mozambique. Secondary data were obtained mainly through an intensive literature review and personal interviews with important septuagenarian personalities that had knowledge and experience because these are the ones that experienced its administration. Results of the review showed that pooling resources of the three countries and labour force would create a competitive territory with economic resilience. Resurrecting the federation with an addition of Mozambique would be an economic advantage, but with a lot of challenges. Based on the principles characterizing the formation of the Southern Africa Development Community, it would be justifiable to consider forming a united republic or federation.

Keywords: Secondary industry, tertiary industry, Britain, labour, economy, industry, trade.

INTRODUCTION

The colonial history of southern Africa to which Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe are part is deeply rooted in Jan van Riebeeck's arrival on the Cape Coast in 1652, representing the Dutch East India Company. He laid the foundations of a future Dutch Cape Colony that no one could have postulated that the process he begun would assume such large proportions 250 years later. It took over land, in successive stages, from the Cape Colony, Orange Free State, Transvaal, Natal, Basutoland, Swaziland, Bechuanaland, Southern Rhodesia, and Northern Rhodesia (Baxter, 2013a). The national liberation struggle that transformed the central African federation was an event in this process and was the sum of many inter-linked events (Mugabe, 1982; Baxter, 2013a).

In the competitive game of colonial adventures played out in Africa and the Far East during the 15th to the 19th century, the law of the survival of the fittest ruled just as it did in the jungle. The Portuguese displaced the Arabs, the Dutch the Portuguese, while the French and British, as they struggled for supremacy, together annihilated the Dutch in many areas. Having survived alone in the Cape, the British began pursuing the Dutch settlers moving northward in search of greater freedom. This northward movement by the Afrikaners resulted in the establishment of two republics: The Orange River Republic (now the Orange Free State) and the Transvaal Republic (now Transvaal), whose northern border was the Limpopo River (Mugabe, 1982). Cecil John Rhodes, a British empire builder then prime minister in the Cape colony, thought that the growing British Empire could be threatened by the northward thrust of the Boers. He immediately took steps to curb it in the interest not only of the British Empire but also of his own quest for mineral fortunes and decided to carve out a zone of British influence from north of the Transvaal. Earlier on, he had already foiled the territorial ambitions of the Boers in Bechuanaland (Botswana) through a treaty signed by Chief Khama and the British government. With that experience in dealing with African traditional leadership he signed a treaty in 1888 with Chief Lobengula of the Ndebele tribe that of occupation over land north of the Limpopo (Baxter, 2013b). This was the beginning of occupation of the territory, later called Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) as one of the achievements of his grandest dreams, (Mugabe 1982).

To further fortify his intents of occupation, in 1889 Rhodes secured a royal charter from Queen Victoria for the British South Africa Company (BSA) which signified a formal occupation. Thus began a colonial history that led to one of the bloodiest conflicts ever fought in Africa: for example, the bitter wars between the Ndebele and the settlers in 1893 and, subsequently, the first national liberation war (*Chimurenga* or *Chindunduma*) of 1896 - 97. Having had dubiously obtained an agreement from the Africans conferring on him the grant of mineral rights, Rhodes turned it into an instrument of political and socioeconomic control of the region. The Africans were both cheated and invaded, and they resorted to war in retaliation. The 1896 - 97 war, with its surprise attacks and ambushes, was aimed at exterminating the enemy, the settlers (Baxter, 2013a, b). In Matabeleland, for example, 130 European settlers were killed within the first week of the war, and the survivors were driven into hiding. In Mashona land some 450 settlers were annihilated as the uprising, beginning in Chief Mashayamombe's area in the Hartley district, spread to other regions. Peace negotiations with the Ndebele were conducted by Rhodes himself. In Mashona land British reinforcements defeated the Shonas, and their leaders were executed (Mugabe 1982).

With the settlers" victory over Africans, all administrative power was vested in the British South Africa Company until 1923, when Britain granted the right of self-government to the settler communities. In 1930 the Land Apportionment Act for instance, the unfair and repressive division of land between the whites and the blacks, with the whites owning 19.9 million ha (49.1 million ac) out of a total of 40.3 million ha (99.6 million ac) was legalized. The same Act legalized discrimination in the social, economic, and educational spheres between blacks and white settler communities. All urban, mining, and industrial areas were designated as whites only zones and no African was permitted to acquire a permanent home in such areas. Schools, hospitals, and social amenities were all within the white areas. This discrimination extended to labour conditions and job opportunities (Mugabe, 1982; Baxter, 2013 a, b).

Africans resented this discriminatory treatment of the settlers. Subsequently and perhaps what became an important step, when the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (1934 - 57) was formed as the first real national grouping, which unfortunately lacked organization and drive and their predecessors early nationalist and trade union movements, aware that the institutions of power were fully controlled by the settlers" government, confined themselves to correcting the grievances arising from racial discrimination by nonviolent means. Consequently, the National Youth League formed in 1955 by James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Edson Sithole, and Dunduzu Chisiza, merged with it in 1957, to provide a broader basis for the mobilization of popular support (Mugabe, 1982; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010).

The ill treatment of black Africans by settlers resonated across sub - Saharan Africa heightening levels of resentment against white rule. As evidenced from recorded history that from the 1920s white European settlers in the Rhodesias had sought some form of amalgamation to counter the overwhelming numerical superiority of resentful black Africans, but that this had been blocked by a British Colonial Office that was sensitive to profound African opposition, was and became a strong basis for Africans to resist any form or territorial amalgamation by settlers (Baxter, 2013a, b; Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010; Microsoft Encarta, 2009). At the same time Britain was stimulated into federating its south-central African territories as a bulwark against Afrikaner nationalism. Even before World War II, Northern Rhodesian whites had begun to consider federation with Southern Rhodesia as a response to growing African assertiveness, and support for federation increased after the war. At the same time, the growing importance of the copper industry in Northern Rhodesia attracted Southern Rhodesian whites to the idea of federation. Wartime collaboration promoted federal ideas among white settlers and in British government circles. It was widely assumed that Southern Rhodesia would provide managerial and administrative skills, Northern Rhodesia copper revenues, and Nyasaland labour for the new entity. Africans in the north, however, feared that federation would prevent political advance and extend Southern Rhodesia's racist laws. Ignoring African opposition, in 1953 Britain's Conservative government brought the territories together in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, commonly known as the Central African Federation. After World War II however, the growth of secondary industries greatly increased white immigration in Southern Rhodesia, compounded by the copper boom in Northern Rhodesia, led white political leaders and industrialists to urge even more strongly the advantages of an amalgamated territory that would provide larger markets and be able to draw more freely on black labour, especially in Nyasaland (see Table 1). The most important though was to exploit the rich copper reserves in Northern Rhodesia for the benefit of the white minority mainly in Southern Rhodesia (Welensky, 1964; Pitch, 1967; Willis, 1967).

Subsequently the amalgamation was forcibly imposed on three central-southern African countries. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland also called *Central African Federation* became inevitable (Figure 1a, b).

Objective and outline of the assessment

The major objective of this study were to; i) determine the possible major socio - political adjustments required to reunite, ii)management and exploitation of the natural resource base, iii) possible major obstacles that would hamper its formation and smooth functioning.

METHODS AND MATERIALS

Study area

The study covered the three territories (Figure 1) that formerly constituted the Central African Federation. Mozambique was considered to be a potentially good addition to the concept of resurrecting the federation. Where necessary, comparisons were made with selected countries with similar ambitions or with federal system of government.

Data collection

An intensive literature reviews to thoroughly examine published literature, government reports, minutes of meetings and anecdotal reports, was carried out. In instances where the data in the report were not very clear, the researcher verified it with the original source. Personal interviews were also conducted with identified individuals with relevant expertise and experience in relevant fields.

FINDINGS

Formation of the federation

With pressure mounted by the colonial regime, particularly the dominant role played by Southern Rhodesian which had a larger European population (Table 1) especially its first leader, Sir Godfrey Huggins and Raphael (Roy) Welensky in Northern Rhodesia a Federation was later created (Figure 2a,b,c,d). However, after World War II, Britain opposed this because Southern Rhodesia would dominate the property and income franchise (which excluded the vast majority of Africans) (Willis, 1967).

Fig. 1 a) Location map of the territories which constituted the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in central Africa 1953 – 1963; b) Shaded countries are all currently independent states of, Malawi (Nyasaland), Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia).

Table 1 The size of white population in Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia before and during the federation

Year	Numbers of white and black inhabitants before and during the Central African Federation							
	Southern Rhodesia		Northern Rhodesia		Nyasaland		Total	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
1927	38,200 (3.98%)	922,000 (96.02%)	4,000 (0.4%)	1,000,000 (99.6%)	1,700 (0.13%)	1,350,000 (99.87%)	43,900 (1.32%)	3,272,000 (98.68%)
1946	80,500 (4.79%)	1,600,000 (95.21%)	21,919 (1.32%)	1,634,980 (97.68%)	2,300 (0.10%)	2,340,000 (99.90%)	104,719 (1.84%)	5,574,980 (98.16%)
1955	125,000 (4.95%)	2,400,000 (95.05%)	65,000 (3.02%)	2,085,000 (96.98%)	6,300 (0.25%)	2,550,000 (99.75%)	196,300 (2.71%)	7,035,000 (97.28%)
1960	223,000 (7.30%)	2,830,000 (92.70%)	76,000 (3.14%)	2,340,000 (96.85%)	9,300 (0.33%)	2,810,000 (99.66%)	308,300 (3.72%)	7,980,000 (96.28%)

(Modified after, Baxter, 2013a, b;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federation_of_Rhodesia_and Nyasaland)



(a)


MAGNI ESSE MEREAMUR

(b)


RHODESIA
4d
POSTAGE
LAKE BANGWEULU
AND NYASALAND

(c)



(d)

Fig. 6 Expression of ownership and control of the territorial resources by the colonial office and the queen as head of the common wealth; a) Flag of the federation, b) Coat of Arms 1953 – 1963, c) Lake Bangweulu in Zambia, d) Victoria Falls Zambia/Zimbabwe, and e) Kariba gorge at the site where the Kariba dam was constructed.

A new *Immigration Act* under CAF of 1954 was promulgated and strictly enforced throughout the life of the federation as if it were one country (Figure 3). In all these decisions, indigenous Africans were not involved, neither were they consulted.

To show that CAF was fully functioning, large projects commenced such as the creation of the Kariba hydro-electric power station which was announced in 1955 all with symbols of the queen. It was a remarkable feat of engineering creating the largest human-built dam on the planet at the time and costing £78 million. Its location highlighted the rivalry among Southern and Northern Rhodesia, with the former attaining its favoured location for the dam (Figure 4a, b).



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FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

IMMIGRATION ACT, 1954

NOTICE TO VISITOR

To NIGEL SOMERSET ROBERTS

Address in Federation T. MANSELL
8, CLARENCE DRIVE, HIGHLANDS SALISBURY

Period of Visit: From 31st December 1959 To 9th January 1960 (60)

TAKE NOTICE that in terms of section 6(2) and (3) of the Immigration Regulations, 1954, as amended, you are required—

(i) to report to an immigration officer at Beit Bridge on 9th January

or at intervals of .... from the date of issue of this notice; and

to surrender this notice to an immigration officer immediately before your departure from the Federation.

Signature of Holder N.S. Roberts

Immigration Officer

IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT
31 DEC 1959
OFFICE DATE STAMP
RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

TO BE COMPLETED IMMEDIATELY BEFORE LEAVING THE FEDERATION

I shall depart from the Federation on ....

by train/aircraft/car via .... (place of departure)

Signature ....

Date ....

Notice surrendered to me

....
Immigration Officer

OFFICE DATE STAMP

Fig.3 Sample of Federation external affairs and immigration controls (Source: www.alamy.com).



(a)

(b)

Fig. 4 Construction of the Kariba dam as one of the symbols of major achievements under CAF and the queen's authority over the federation. (Source: www.alamy.com).

The Federation also issued its first postage stamps in 1954, all with a portrait of Queen Elizabeth II (Figure 5)

Fig. 5   A standard Central African Federation issued stamp (Source: www.alamy.com).

Africans were enraged by Welensky's ploy to mortgage their land and rights and towards the end of the 1950s, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which were also the most disadvantaged, overtly protested against the white minority rule of CAF. In July 1958 for instance the late Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the leader of the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) later renamed Malawi Congress Party, returned from Great Britain to Nyasaland as a show of solidarity, while in October the militant Kenneth David Kaunda became the leader of the Zambian African National Congress (ZANC), a split from the Northern Rhodesian ANC. (Pitch, 1967). CAF authorities felt threatened by the awakening of Africans and banned ZANC in March 1959, and in June imprisoned its leader Kenneth Kaunda for nine months. Mr. Mainza Chona with his colleagues created the United National Independence Party (UNIP), a successor to ZANC. In early 1959, unrest broke out in Nyasaland, which, was "economically the poorest, politically the most advanced and numerically the least Europeanized of the three Territories." (see Table 2). A state of emergency was declared and Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda and other Nyasaland's NAC leadership arrested and their party banned and Southern Rhodesian troops were deployed to bring order (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010; Baxter, 2013a,b).

Additionally, during the Congolese crisis, Africans increasingly viewed CAF Prime Minister, Sir Roy Welensky (originally from Broken Hill in Northern Rhodesia) as an arch-reactionary and his support for Katanga separatism further accentuated the matter (Microsoft Encarta, 2009).

With mounting opposition by African nationalist leaders of the three territories who regarded it as a plot conceived by the white settlers (especially those in Southern Rhodesia) to thwart African aspirations and as a strategy to delay the independence process in Malawi (Nyasaland) and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), the federation was dissolved on Dec. 31, 1963 (British Government, 1963). It was opposed because during the federal period (1953 – 1963) Africans of all three territories were pitted against the whites and the tensions between them were intensified. No African was appointed to any cabinet portfolio.

In southern Rhodesia, earlier prosperity muted African protest although dissent mounted in the impoverished reserves where disaffection was fueled by attempts to restructure peasant production at a time of growing landlessness and congestion on inferior land. Despite the rhetoric of multiracial partnership, the economic advantages of federation appeared mainly to benefit

Southern Rhodesian whites. Consequently, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), both led by Joshua Nkomo, were successively proscribed in 1961 and 1962 (Mugabe 1982).

The British Prime Minister Macmillan expressed doubts and apprehension about CAF's political viability, although economically he felt it was a good idea. A Royal Commission to advise Macmillan on the future of the CAF, was formed and led by The Viscount Monckton of Brenchley, former Post master General. In the advance party was the Commonwealth Secretary, the Earl of Home, sent to prepare Welensky, who was distinctly displeased about the arrival of the Commission (Don, 1965). Lord Home supported Welensky and the existence of the CAF. However, Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod a fellow Scot, favoured African rights and dissolving the federation. The Prime Minister Macmillan at the time supported Lord Home's suggestion to retain CAF, but Changes within British politics especially the rise of the Labour Party compelled the Prime Minister to change his position in favour of Africans. Subsequently, the new Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, negotiated the '1961 Constitution', a new constitution for the CAF which greatly reduced Britain's powers over it. But by 1962, the British and the CAF cabinet had agreed that Nyasaland should be allowed to secede, though Southern Rhodesian Premier Sir Edgar Whitehead committed the British to keep this secret until after the 1962 election in the territory. A year later, the same status was given to Northern Rhodesia, decisively ending the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 31st December 1963. Malawi subsequently attained independence on July 6, 1964 and Zambia on October 24, 1964, which marked the effective end of the federation.

After the breakup of the central African federation, the white settler community in Southern Rhodesia established an illegal UDI as the Republic of Rhodesia in November 1965 (Mugabe, 1982). Eventually the territory of Rhodesia became an independent state of Zimbabwe in 1980, ending the long history of colonial rule in the three countries that were supposed to be one economically progressive unitary state under the federation. Zimbabwe which had a larger population of settlers and with a superior industrial base remained under the colonial yoke until August 1, 1979, a few days before the Commonwealth heads of government meeting opened in Lusaka, Zambia. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told the British Parliament that her government was committed to genuine majority rule in Rhodesia (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010). The Commonwealth meeting produced an agreement on Rhodesia that recognized the principle of new elections based on one man, one vote under British authority. Britain undertook to convene a constitutional conference to be attended by both the black and white leadership from Rhodesia, prior to which a cease-fire had to be established to create an atmosphere of peace for the elections (Mugabe, 1982).

The Lancaster House conference was attended by the Patriotic Front (Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union – ZANU; and Joshua Nkhomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union - ZAPU) delegation, jointly led by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, and by the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia delegation, with Bishop Muzorewa, Silas Mundawarara, Ian Smith, and Ndabaningi Sithole as the principal members attended the conference (Mugabe 1982). The British delegation was led by Lord Carrington, as chair person. Major areas of concern discussed were; i) the composition of the House of Assembly and Senate which granted disproportionate racial representation to the white community. In the House of Assembly, they had 20 out of 100 seats, and in the Senate 10 out of 40 seats, ii) the need to pay prompt and adequate compensation for the deprivation of property especially as this affected the right to acquire land for the resettlement of the peasants. The issue here was that Britain had to raise large funds for this purpose, iii) a constitutional amendment procedure requiring 100 percent; concurrence of the total membership of the House of Assembly on certain issues, iv) the cease-fire arrangements and positioning of the warring forces during the cease-fire and v) the status of the guerrilla forces which Lord Carrington finally accepted as "lawful forces," while at the same time refusing to accord them an equal status with the white Rhodesian army (Mugabe 1982).

The agreement was far from perfect, but it contained more positive than negative aspects and, insofar as it granted independence within a democratic political order, it constituted a viable base on which political power could be built and sustained overtime. Zimbabwe also became a member of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference, whose inaugural meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1979, followed by a conference held in Lusaka, Zambia of heads of government of nine southern African states: Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Malawi. The objectives of SADCC as stated in the Lusaka Declaration of April 1, 1980 were; i) the reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa which was at the time under the apartheid regime, ii)the forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration, iii) the mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate, and regional policies, and iv) concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of our strategy for economic liberation (Ostergaard, 1989; John, 1979; John, 1983).

The steps taken by Zimbabwe to join SADC at its birth (Lionel, 1981) signified the desire by Africans to join hands in improving their economies and livelihoods. This implies therefore, that the suggestion to resurrect and modernize the CAF can be achieved because it fits within the African desire to unite as also earlier suggested by Nkrumah (1968). In July 1981 for instance a summit meeting was held in Harare to appraise the work so far accomplished at the ministerial level of SADCC for which each member had been assigned a task. Zimbabwe was assigned to develop a Southern African Food Security Plan. Coordinating machinery was decided and the headquarters were to be in Gaborone and the president of Botswana, then Quett Masire, remained as chairman of SADCC while Zimbabwe was chosen to provide executive secretarial services (Douglas, 1983; Tostensen and Roger, 1982). These regional political initiatives signify that Africans have always wanted to be unitary and stronger to face the ever challenging and hostile global community.

Industries

The region is deficient mainly manufacturing industries which produce a vast array of consumer and producer goods such as; processed food, clothing, heavy machinery, automobiles, electronics, and household appliances, save for some rudimentary ones in Zimbabwe. On the basis of an elementary classification of Industries as primary, secondary, or tertiary, it was found that the primary industries which use raw natural resources as major inputs are the most prevalent in the region (see Table 4). Agriculture, commercial fishing, mining, and the forest industry are the prevalent primary industries in the region. These industries mainly use farmland, oceans (Mozambique), mineral deposits, and forests, respectively, as their major inputs and this is reflected in the nature of goods exported by Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Table 4).

The absence of secondary industries which create a link between primary and tertiary industries was also noted by Ostergaard (1989) and accounts for the region's inability to grow their economies and create jobs for their citizens. These countries consume what they do not produce and produce what they do not consume. Where there are some attempts to develop some rudimentary secondary industries the goods produced are mainly non-durable goods that are used for a short period of time, such as disposable materials, clothing, food, toothpaste, soap, and other items. The durable goods which are used repeatedly over long periods of time, such as automobiles and washing machines are lacking. Tertiary industries which provide services such as retail stores, universities, hotels, banks, television stations, hospitals, and travel agencies are at different levels of development. Those that are well developed are foreign owned or subsidised through donor support. Those that are locally owned such as television, health services and universities are not adequately financed and hence not operating at expected levels. Universities in particular lack facilities for research and wealthy citizens opt to send their children to western countries.

In fact, even the so called locally owned tertiary institutions are more often than not sustained in a way either directly or indirectly supported by western countries for their survival. For example, most hospital equipment and drugs are imported. All military hardware is imported. Most functions of the public service depend on donor support. So while the veil of colonialism and the distasteful federation may have been banished at least by way of handing over political power to the black majority, the engine that drives this political machinery still remains with the western countries.

RESURRECTING AND MODERNIZING THE FEDERATION

Many interviewees supported the reconstitution and modernisation of CAF which would be renamed "The new Central African Federation" or "The United People's Republic of Central Africa (of Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and many other suggestions. The name by itself would not be a major factor at the beginning but the need to form a strong and resilient economy (Widstrand (1969) with direct routes to the sea, with numerical strength of the population that guarantees a competitive local market and a rich source of labour.

Figures on the state of resources in the three territories, the comparative advantages of each territory as well as suggestions for new members that would be incorporated in the federation demonstrate that forming a union government of some sort would be the best idea. The inherent local divisions and conflicts prevalent in each territory would be minimised if the territories were to be reunited.

The size of the territory would also increase in size by 799, 380 sq. km (39%) from the 1, 261, 857 sq km (former CAF members) to 2, 061, 857 sq. km and 41 % larger that the Republic of South Africa by 842,147 sq. km or almost the size of Congo DRC at 2,344, 885 sq. km. It would also have access to a coast line of 2, 470 km. This would enable the interior of central – southern Africa to have access to the marine resources within the territorial boundaries of Mozambique and the open sea which is only now being exploited by mainly European countries.

Justification for regional integration

There are many reasons justifying a union. People of the region share similar culture and language and were only separated by international borders drawn during the colonial era.

Shared history and ethnicity

Ethnicity and language

All indigenous inhabitants are of Bantu origin. Major languages spoken in the four territories are, chewa, bemba and shona. The use of the land by local people is also fairly uniform. The Lozi (Barotse), who dominate much of the upper Zambezi for instance, have taken advantage of the seasonal flooding of the Barotse Plain for an agricultural economy that is supplemented by animal husbandry, fishing, and trade. In the mid Zambezi, the Tonga, Shona, Chewa, and Nsenga peoples, all largely practice subsistence agriculture. In Mozambique the practice is the same save for the riverine population where some engage in commercial agriculture such as the growing of sugarcane and cotton in particular a practice established by the Portuguese (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2010).

Shared colonial history

All the four territories were colonised by European powers, Britain and Portugal respectively. By the beginning of the twentieth century the subcontinent was under European rule, and its disparate societies were increasingly meshed into a single political economy. The annexation of African territories meant the establishment of new states, and colonial rule was given perceptible effect by policemen and soldiers, administrators, tax collectors, traders, prospectors, and labour recruiters. Railroads connected the coast with the interior, opening up new markets and releasing new sources of labour. New boundaries were drawn that lasted beyond the colonial period, and the Zambezi became the frontier between the settler south and the "tropical dependencies" of East and Central Africa, although Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) occupied a middle ground. In all the territories whites, with state assistance, controlled private property and the means of production, while Africans were seen solely as labour. Settlers everywhere were united in their determination to assert white supremacy.

Shared Zambezi River catchment

The four countries hold the largest catchment areas for the Zambezi River from its source at Kalene Hill (1,460 metres) above sea level, in North-western Zambia to the Indian Ocean (Figure 6).

Fig. 6 Major River catchments, in the conceptual federation Enhancing Power generation; Kariba and Cahora Bassa schemes

It is the largest river draining a large portion of south-central Africa. Together with its tributaries, it forms the fourth largest river basin of the continent. It flows eastward for about 3,540 kilometres (2,200 miles) into the Indian Ocean passing through the four countries. Along its course are the Kariba (Zambia/Zimbabwe) and Cahora Bassa (Mozambique) dams, which are the two of Africa's largest hydroelectric projects (Figure 6). The river also crosses or forms part of the boundaries with, Angola, Zambia, Namibia, and Botswana, but the countries holding the largest catchments are four. Because the river crosses so many countries, the use of its waters has been the subject of a series of international agreements and is certainly a potential source of international conflict. Conflicts regarding its use would be minimised if the four countries were united.

ADVANTAGES OF FORMING A FEDERATION

The inclusion of Mozambique

The inclusion of Mozambique would enhance and forge an integrated and more resilient economy. The other three countries would have access to the sea and also have access to sea resources. Currently, European fishing vessels have been fishing in African waters and open seas while African landlocked countries have no access to the sea resources to improve their nutrition. Additionally, small economies face serious constraints in their effort to build integrated basic industries. Combining the economies of three or four countries expands both the domestic and foreign markets and the resource base, and expansion of production structures which benefit member states. Ostergaard (1989) explained the difficulties Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries faced to establish a tractor industry. The unsuccessful independent attempts by each of the SADC states to end dependence on tractor imports for instance underscores the difficulties faced by small economies. Unnecessary competition is generated instead of pooling resources together and forming a larger market.

Synchrony with SADC founding principles

Southern African Development Community (SADC) originally (1979–92) Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) is a regional organization of southern African countries that works to promote economic cooperation and integration among the member states and to preserve their economic independence. Member states are Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malaŵi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The first conference was held in 1979, on the eve of Zimbabwe's (Rhodesia's) independence under black majority rule. The SADC's activities are coordinated at annual conferences of the heads of government and of a council of ministers from all the member states. The SADC plans, coordinates, and finances various projects in agriculture and animal husbandry, energy, mining, disease control, telecommunications, and regional trade. Such efforts however, are far from building an integrated and resilient economy. A united block under one constitution would yield better results than SADC is at the moment.

Among the SADC's earliest priorities were projects to improve the existing rail and road networks between the member states so they could reduce their dependence on South African ports and transport routes for the shipment of their imports and exports. These projects greatly improved the region's transportation infrastructure. With the advent of majority black rule in South Africa and that country's membership in the Ostergaard (1989), however, the focus of the organization shifted toward greater regional economic integration. A revitalized federation under the key priority of economic independence would be a step towards attainment of the major goal of regional integration. Small and fragmented economies tend to be easily destabilised by external influence for example one country can have equipment of different make and can neither share knowledge and expertise due to lack of standardisation. There is also lack of linkages between them such that they cannot export to neighbouring countries.

Such challenges can be addressed in a federation.

It is on this basis that the idea to resurrect the new CAF is hinged. Despite the differences in the levels of economic development and ideologies, it is very critical for the long-term survival of many African states not to allow short-term national interests to interfere with the achievement of federation goals which are essential for survival in face of deepening exploitation by western based corporations. Members of the federation should not see development plans in isolation but regionally.

Emulsified political differences

A blend of political regimes inherent in each territory may be neutralised. The new phase of cooperation may be more important than pursuing national differences. For instance, in all the potential members of the federation there are either regional and/or tribal differences which more often than not interfere with normal functioning of some state institutions and can be a source of civil strife or conflict. In Zimbabwe is the Shona – Ndebele differences, in Malawi the north – south divide just like Mozambique and in Zambia the Barotse Agreement and many others too numerous to list. The profiles of these national areas of conflict may with the best of optimism be less tense under CAF than they are today.

CHALLENGES OF FORMING A SUCCESSFUL FEDERATION

Uneven economic development between countries

Forming a federation is the best way forward, but as an old English adage states, it is easier said than done. There are numerous obstacles. The four countries (Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are at different levels of economic development and also have different ideological preferences. There are also differences in the practices of inherited national institutions. At one time just to use as an example, there was a workers' stand off on the Zambia side of the Tanzania – Zambia Railways (TAZARA) regarding retirement packages. On the Zambian side the retirement age was at 55 years while in Tanzania it was 60 or 65. Such differences which appear minor may disrupt operations on the affected side.

The trans-national corporations and banks as well as donor policies are not uniform across the four countries, with some countries being favoured over others. The building of a federation may face numerous challenges from the donor community which may transform into a cooperation rather economic integration.

The possibility of forming a federation which might modify investment patterns and contribute to the creation of conditions for an accelerated and self-sustaining development is paradoxically limited by the very condition which makes it indispensable. Miljan (1981) noted that weaker members of any group may fear that they will be overwhelmed by the more developed members. In this case Zimbabwe has been seen to be a potential dominant force in the federation and the region only second to South Africa. Perhaps adopting an industrial location policy that ensures equitable distribution of benefits could be one promising way to overcome the different levels of industrialisation and the apprehension of weaker members. However, Ravenhill (1986) demonstrated how uneven economic development can prevent integration by citing the East African Community (EAC) which comprised Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. He noted that such policies tend to favour less developed countries. The more developed countries consider the costs resulting from allocating industries according to equilibrium criteria to be too high. The loss of foreign investment or a single manufacturing concern to a neighbouring country has serious consequences for local employment, the balance of payment and not the least political support. The 1964 -1965 Kampala - Mbale Agreement of the East African Community for instance, included an agreement on the allocation of certain major industries. Shortly after the agreements were formulated, Kenya which was already earning disproportionately larger share from the Community unilaterally withdrew its commitment to support the allocation of a vehicle assembly plant to Tanzania. Kenya's decision was prompted by a group of local and foreign investors which offered to build a plant of this type in Kenya (Ravenhill, 1989). This example shows that the influence of foreign corporations on particularly poor countries is enormous and is a great obstacle to any planned regional integration.

Ideological differences and nationalism

Different degrees of ideological differences and levels of nationalism is a major obstacle. Member countries often pursue different national development strategies. Some have a large number of government owned enterprises while others encourage free enterprise or private sector driven as was the case in Zimbabwe before the land redistribution programme. There is likely to be a conflict particularly on the allocation of industries. Okolo (1985) wrote about the Economic Community of West African States in which he found that governments guided by different ideologies had a high likelihood of clashing over foreign trade opportunities. Therefore, the current political and economic heterogeneity among the former Federation Member states suggest possibilities for open friction.

National economic competition spurred by nationalism can hinder integration. Some subtle examples exist on nationalistic stance taken by member's state. The down listing of elephant population to facilitate sale of ivory has often put neighbouring countries on the spot light. Countries take positions on the basis of national gain and not the long-term views as was the case at the Conference of the Parties held in South Africa in 2016 when Botswana differed with its SADC neighbours choosing to support Kenya which does not permit sustainable consumptive utilisation. If member states evaluate the benefits of the federation on the basis of immediate national gains, then the federation would collapse.

The influence of transnational corporations and banks as destabilising forces

Transnational corporations pervasively dominate trade, production and financing (Nixon and Colin, 1981). By their design they would not permit balancing of economic development among member states. The presence of these trans-nationals more often than not, drain away the investable surpluses, oppose establishment of capital goods industries as that would destroy a market for their goods, promote capital intensive technologies (in Zambia job losses in the mining sector are very common as machines replace people in the name of reducing costs), aggravate uneven development as they prefer areas with basic facilities and do not consider opening new areas which they consider to be a responsibility of the state, increase brain drain which weakens state institutions, and often divide countries through biased policies (John, 1979). Since all potential members of the federation are donor dependent the role of transitional corporation in destabilising the integration cannot be ignored. The countries of the region have no power to influence these corporations to transfer appropriate technology making the policy of industrial development a fallacy.

The role of transnational corporations and banks and financing capital projects

The foreign dominated commercial banking institutions in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe serve as conveyor belts for transnational corporate policies that siphon out locally generated investable surpluses and in a way prevent the accumulation and reinvestment of it in a way that foster integrated industrial development (Sarkis, 1980; Rodney,1972). This

hinders direction of funds to more productive areas of the economy such as manufacturing, e.g. of tractors, textile and others that would support primary extraction industries to venture into processing. For example, the region needs more of smaller tractors e.g. $\leq$ 50 Hp., and few of 50 Hp to revolutionarize the agricultural sector. However, the domination in trade and production and the ability and opportunity of the trans-nationals to think in terms that extend beyond each country, makes it very difficult for governments to control. The financial institutions would also be less willing to fund such projects as the developed countries would have no market for their tractors (Chanda, 1988). All trans-nationals of global influence seek to maximise global profits and are rarely interested in local welfare (Rodney, 1972). This is very vivid in Zambia where there is nothing to show in terms of infrastructure and industrial development despite the more than 100 years of mining. Only signs of pollution remain and old and dilapidated houses and golf courses which were originally meant to entertain the white regime. Ostergaard (1989) showed that trans-nationals throughout the third world siphon out significant amounts of profits mainly by means of 'transfer pricing' where any aspect of intra-corporate interchange is set up as if it were a transaction. Murray (1981) said that such transfer pricing may be done in many ways such as; services, general management, head office expenditures, meetings, insurance, blue prints, capital goods maintenance, research and development, and loans. Such transfer pricing ultimately maximises consolidated after-tax global profits, which can also be applied to maximise government subsidies to transnational corporate ventures or to minimise local tax payments.
Barnet and Muller (1974) and Mytelka (1979) provided substantial evidence on transfer of pricing in Latin America. The study found that the effective annual rate of return on declared net worth of the subsidiaries ranged from a low of 38 percent to a high of 962 percent with an average of 79 percent of US and European based trans-nationals. Yet the same year these firms average declared profits submitted to the Colombian tax authorities was a mere 6.7 percent. Such findings were also confirmed by scholars on Africa. Stone and Colin (1986) estimated an over-invoicing of imports into all developing countries at 7.5 to 12.5 percent and reckoned that exports are under invoiced by rather more. If these figures hold for Zimbabwe for instance, Colin (1986) estimated that the country could be losing as much as or perhaps more than USD 100 million annually on both exports and imports. This unfair trade environment makes African goods uncompetitive while at the same time contributing to high production costs as all imported materials tend to be higher that than their real market value (Ostergaard, 1989). This trend still continues to date and is likely to prevent the growth of industries in the presumed federation.

If indeed similar amounts as is the case for Zimbabwe are lost annually in all members of the SADC and presumed Federation then, the trans-nationals rob the region's economies of sorely needed investable surpluses generated from production. Consequently, these countries cannot fund their projects unless with the help of the Bretons Wood Institutions (Theodore, 1976; Chanda, 1988; Havelock, 1975).
In fact, trans-national corporations oppose development of capital goods production for reasons of competition. While on the other hand trans-nationals have invested heavily in capital goods production in regional sub-centres like South Africa, which to date still dominates trade in the region. Therefore, these trans-nationals are also likely to oppose the development of capital goods production in the presumed federation members. This perspective of the trans-nationals clearly under cuts the federation's and SADC aims to reduce dependence on South Africa. One such vivid example is the current expansion of South Africa's retail chain of shops such as Shoprite, Pick 'in' Pay, Game Stores and others throughout the east and southern African sub regions stifling local retail businesses beyond recovery.

Because trans-nationals have ready access to capital and technology they tend to employ capital intensive technology in their production units in the third world. In Zambia for instance, whenever technology improves, machines have replaced people and the mining sector has inevitably laid-off manpower in the name of reducing production costs. Truly, transnational corporations do not only prefer capital intensive technology but also employ labour saving managing techniques and practices which often conflicts with the policies of the third world countries of creating employment for the people and reducing poverty (Havelock, 1975). This is at odds with the need to create gainful and stable employment opportunities for the growing number of youths graduating from an increasing number of universities and colleges.

Transnational's potential opposition to the formation of a federation

It is very likely that the transnational's will either directly or indirectly oppose or frustrate the formation of a federation. Owing to the disproportional gains from the poor state of the industrial base in the region, transnationals will obviously resist economic integration and plans to develop and strengthen the industrial base. The transnationals would be working against their own interests if they were to encourage and support regional groups that seek economic independence (Rodney, 1972). Ostergaard (1989) argued that operating on profit maximisation trans-national corporations may aggravate regional inequalities. In the name of efficiency, trans-national affiliates tend to overwhelmingly locate in the developed areas such as South Africa and Zimbabwe. The tendency to locate in existing enclaves may conflict with the federation's principle for fair and equitable sharing in the location of industries.

As trans-nationals also have capacity to pay higher wages than governments they may also contribute to the local and international 'brain drain' of qualified people from the public sector which ultimately weakens the planning and implementation capacities of the public sector and increases and sustains the disparity in income distribution. This sets a domino effect where public sector employees always view employment in the transnationals as green pasture and only wait for opportunities to arise for them to leave government employment.

Transnationals are also a powerful lobby group and can influence government's decision making machinery. Owing to their superior financial power in comparison with most African governments, they usually have an ear with governments. In order to achieve very favourable investment terms, they often exploit their position by playing one government off against another, which ultimately divides them apart. In seeking to broaden their markets for their imported manufactured goods they lobby for trade liberalization which ultimately stifles local initiatives.

Foreign banks

Foreign banks undoubtedly have an influence on the monetary, financial and industrial structures of host countries in Africa. Mutharika (1981) noted that transnational banks facilitated out flow of financial resources causing severe lack of capital among integrative schemes in Africa. This is because the financial institutions in Africa play a significant role in influencing the degree and extent and direction of development by determining the amount and distribution patterns of short and long-term credit for the productive sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, mining, construction, tourism and others. These transnational banks are not under the control of African governments but transnational corporations whose policies are orchestrated from overseas headquarters. As such, it and will always be difficult for African governments to mobilise resources for investment in development as was earlier acknowledged by Mutharika (1986). Germidis and Michalet (1984) studied 12 banks in developing countries and concluded that the foreign banking sector played a negligible role in supporting industrial growth of host countries.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For most countries in Africa and the potential members of the proposed federation in particular, independence which they claim to have acquired from Britain and Portugal respectively apparently has not yet dawned. The years of independence, Malawi July 6, 1964, Zambia October 24, 1964, Zimbabwe April 18 1980 and 1975 for Mozambique are not independence days in reality but merely the beginning of the decolonisation process. The impact of more than half a century of colonial rule has had severe negative impacts on Africans. It will take time before African states can be fully independent economically. For instance, in a number of former French colonies of West Africa, it was and perhaps still is easier to fly from one country to Paris in France then fly back to a neighbouring country than flying straight across borders. Such is the deep rooted colonial hegemony of both mind and soul.

In many generations to come therefore, it will be extremely difficult for many African countries to form a unitary state similar to the United States of America. The foreign powers would never allow Africans to achieve a true union. Regional co operations such as the SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, or the African Union will continue to be platforms where Africans meet to share how they are discriminated and exploited by the west through multilateral institutions like the IMF and the World Bank with no real unity. Reconstituting and modernising CAF may be a step towards the economic decolonisation but would require highly committed leadership and hardworking citizens with a common vision as a prerequisite.

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